A dual U.S.-Iranian national and CEO of an Iran-based technology company was arrested today on a federal criminal complaint charging him with violating U.S. sanctions against Iran by acquiring sophisticated U.S.-origin networking, security. Encryption equipment for Iranian customers — including the Iranian regime’s nuclear and military establishments. “As alleged, Ghomi enriched himself by supplying U.S. technology to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and other sanctioned entities responsible for the Iran’s nuclear program,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A.
Key details of the case
“The National Security Division will hold accountable those who violate our laws to further Iran’s nuclear ambitions.”. “Ghomi is accused of aiding our declared enemies by selling U.S.-origin computer networking parts to Iran and earning millions of dollars in violation of U.S. sanction laws,” said First Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California.
Moreover, “Our nation’s laws prohibiting doing business with one of the world’s largest state sponsors of terrorism must be enforced and obeyed. We will hold him accountable by seeking an appropriate prison sentence and by seizing his assets, including his $35 million Newport Beach mansion.”. “Today’s arrest reflects our commitment to disrupt the illegal flow of American technology to foreign nations, especially our adversaries,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge Darren Lian of the IRS Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI) Los Angeles Field Office.

Ghomi spent years exploiting United States financial systems and procurement channels to move controlled equipment to Iran while hiding his activities behind front companies and falsified documentation. We will continue to work with our partners to safeguard national security by utilizing our financial investigative expertise.”. Jamshid Ghomi, 63, of Newport Coast, California, is charged with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
Enforcement actions and official statements
In addition, ghomi is expected to make his initial appearance this afternoon in U.S. District Court in Santa Ana, California. The IEEPA and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) impose controls and restrictions on transactions involving Iran based on the threats posed by Iran to the national security of the United States, including its pursuit of nuclear weapons and sponsorship of terrorism. For complete details, refer to the official DOJ press release.
As a result, the IEEPA and ITSR prohibit the export, re-export, sale. Supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran without first obtaining authorization from OFAC. . According to the affidavit filed with the complaint, Ghomi is the founder, owner, and CEO of Faraz Pardaz Rayaneh Co.
Ltd. (FPR), a Tehran-based computer networking company. For more than a decade, Ghomi has used FPR to procure U.S.-origin networking equipment for customers in Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions. Ghomi or FPR never obtained a license from the U.S. For related coverage, see Russian disinformation group Storm 1516 targets Tisza Party with fake Jeffrey Epstein documents.

Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) authorizing those transactions. Ghomi identified, negotiated, purchased, and arranged the shipment of large quantities of controlled U.S. technology for his own company. From 2011 to 2015, he used his own eBay and PayPal accounts to make more than 400 purchases of computer-networking equipment, directing the goods to intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
In 2023, Ghomi personally negotiated the purchase of U.S.-origin networking equipment directly from suppliers in Minnesota and Nebraska, routing it through a UAE front company and on to FPR in Iran. . None of these items could be lawfully exported to Iran without a license from OFAC. From 2014 to 2018, Ghomi arranged the smuggling of more than 250 metric tons (275.6 U.S. tons) of networking equipment into Iran, using freight forwarders and intermediaries in Dubai to disguise that Iran was the true destination. For related coverage, see Buckingham palace shuts down Epstein survivor meeting over high stakes legal fears.
Subsequently, ghomi knew this conduct was illegal and took deliberate steps to conceal it. He directed his UAE co-conspirators to keep his name off shipping paperwork, to omit invoices from shipments bound for Iran. On at least two occasions to hide U.S.-origin computer equipment inside larger shipments.
He used front companies in the UAE to obscure his role. He personally received warnings on invoices and software licenses that exporting these goods to Iran was prohibited. Ghomi and his co-conspirators referred to Iran as “Motherland” in their internal correspondence concerning the equipment’s procurement.
In particular, fPR’s annual sales exceeded $10 million and ran to hundreds of Iranian companies and government entities, many of which were subject to U.S. sanctions. A relatively small but significant portion of that business went to the most sensitive end-users in Iran: the Iranian regime’s nuclear and military establishment. From 2017 to 2023, FPR supplied U.S.-origin computer networking equipment to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
Furthermore, the Iranian government agency responsible for Iran’s nuclear program, including its centrifuge and uranium-enrichment programs. State Department sanctioned AEOI in 2020 for playing a leading role in Iran's nonperformance of its nuclear commitments, including exceeding the limits on its uranium stockpile and enrichment levels. . According to the affidavit, AEOI required FPR to register as an approved vendor, which it did in 2021 and 2022.
Investigation and prosecution details
From 2014 to 2022, FPR supplied U.S.-origin networking, security. Encryption equipment to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics — the Iranian ministry responsible for research, development, and manufacturing across Iran’s defense enterprise — and to affiliated military and defense-electronics entities. FPR’s 2017 contract with Iran Computer Industries, signed by Ghomi, expressly identified the buyer as the “Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. Iran Computer Industries.”.


